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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
NIELSON SCOTT COMPANY, INC. 
AND DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES, 
DBA GREEK GARDENS,· 
Defendants and Appellants, 
NEILSON SCOTT COMPANY, IiK., 
Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Respondent, 
vs. 
DrnETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES, 
Third-Party Defendant and 
Third-Party Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 
16136 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fourth District Court 
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen 
GORDON J, LOH 
175 East First North 
Loga~, Utah 84321 
GERALD L. TURNER 
343 South 400 East 
GLEN j I ELLI s 
359 West Center, Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO C IiY CORPORATIOI( 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
NI ELSON SCOTT COMPANY J. INC. 
AND DEMETR IOS AGATHANGELIDESJ 
OBA GREEK GARDENS, 
) 
! 
l Defendants and Appellants, ) 
-----l NI ELSON SCOTT COMPANY J me' J 
Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Respondent, 
vs. 
DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDESJ 
Third-Party Defendant and 
Third-Party Appellant. 
l 
l 
l 
Supreme Court No. 
16136 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for breach of contract by a 
subcontractor for public improvements done for the 
City under a general contract with Nielson Scott 
Company, Inc. under which Demetrios Agathangelides, 
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dba Greek Gardens, was the subcontractor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents request the Court to sustain th; 
finding of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent Provo City contracted with 
Nielson Scott Company, Inc., for the performance of 
a major downtown redevelopment project on Center street 
in Provo. Nielson Scott in turn contracted with the 
appellant herein, Greek Gardens, as a subcontractor 
in charge of the tree planting and landscaping portion 
of the redevelopment project. The contract was awarded 
on the 11th of September, 1974 and the appellant had 
all of the trees provided for in the contract installed 
by December 10, 1975. An inspection of the trees on 
May 5, 1976, disclosed that 12 of the trees had died 
over the winter and the City through John Maas, the 
architect who was in charge of the job, made demand 
upon the appellant to replace the 12 trees. 
The appellant agreed by letter (Exhibit No. 71 
to replace the 12 trees but requested that replanting 
be postponed until November of 1976 because of the 
hazard to the trees in transplanting them when they 
were not in a dorrnan t state. The architect 1 Maas' 
approved the delay in replanting and noted in his 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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testimony (see trial transcript pages 26, 27 and 31) 
that in the fall of the year, trees are dormant and that 
because of the risks of transportation in cold weather, 
and other factors, the risk of loss continued still 
upon the subcontractor until the following spring when 
it was possible for the first time to determine whether 
the trees were alive or dead. 
It was stipulated during the trial that in 
the spring of 1977, it was observed and without dispute 
that all 12 of the trees that had been replanted the 
first time had died over the winter. 
The trial court granted judgment on the basis 
that the responsibility to see that the trees were 
alive continued until the next spring. Until then, 
it was not possible to determine whether the trees in 
fact survived the winter dormant stage. The lower 
court made findings that the trees in fact did not ever 
show life and rendered judgment on the basis of the 
actual cost to the City of buying and installing replace-
ment trees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBCONTRACTOR PROV ID ING TRE0f.;S R 8 PLANTING PRO ECT H A C ;1-~i~~ I~§THe~~~HYA~~TA~PA~~Nt~~E~Lt6~ 
The original contract referred to in the trial 
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as Exhibit No. 3 and particularly paragraph 31 (d} on 
page 8, anticipates a warranty period of one year after 
date of "substantial completion." As the appellant 
sets forth in his brief, it was found that 12 of t~ 
trees installed under the contract by the subcontractor 
died during the first winter. 
The contractor submitted to the City a written 
request that instead of replacing those 12 trees in 
May of 1976 when they were found to be dead that he 
be allowed to defer the replanting until the next fall. 
Consent was given and that consent amounted to a modi-
fication of the original contract, a novation of t~ 
original contract terms, since substantial completion 
had been accomplished in December of 1975. 
The doctrine of modification of contract (see 
12 Arn. Jur. Contracts §465 at page 934) recognizes that 
a written contract may be modified with the assent of 
both parties providing that the modification be sus-
ceptible of proof and that there be consideration 
given. Consideration in this case, as recited in the 
original document (Exhibit 7) was the fact that the 
' · t th delay i· n replanting would City s acquiescence o e 
be of benefit to the subcontractor in that the trees 
would have a better chance of surviving if they were 
planted in the fall rather than in the late spring. 
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There was a reciprocal disadvantage, however, 
in the fact that the City would not be able to tell 
whether the trees actually came out of their dormant 
stage until after the end of the warranty period. 
It is implicit from the general reading of the 
contract that the purpose of the warranty period was to 
guarantee that the trees as planted would survive at 
least one growing season. John Maas, who was the 
architect on the job, testified before the Court 
(trial transcript pages 29 and 31) that the extension 
of the time for planting the trees in the first replant-
ing made it impossible to determine whether the second 
replanting would actually survive the winter until 
after the one-year warranty period had expired. The 
responsibility remained upon the subcontractor until 
the next spring when it was discernible whether or not 
the trees budded out and leafed sufficient to establish 
that they were in fact growing and living trees. 
Our legislature has addressed the dual subjects 
of express warranties and implied warranty for merchant-
ability in the Uniform Commercial Code, and particularly 
in Sections 70A~2-313 and 70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. 
Section 313 states: 
70A-2-313. Express warranties 
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by affir~~tion, promise, description, 
sample.--(1) Express warranties by the 
seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise 
made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part 
of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
Section 314 provides: 
.•• a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract 
for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. 
It is the contention of the respondent that 
Greek Gardens is subject to both the express warranty 
for the one year period after substantial completion 
and by modification of that contract for a sufficient 
period of time to determine whether the substitute 
plants were themselves viable. The appellant, as 
an acknowledged landscaping contractor and nurseryman, 
is in fact a seller of goods of the kind which he con-
tracted to provide for the City and is therefore, in 
addition, liable on the implied warranty statute. 
The interpretation of warranty statutes with 
respect to sale of seed and nursery stock has been a 
prolific source of litigation and compilations of the 
many hundreds of cases on the subject are found in 
16 A.L.R. 859, 32 A.L.R. 1241, 62 A.L.R, 451, 11 7 
A.L.R. 470, 168 A.L.R. 581, 40 A.L.R.2d 273. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah long 
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ago determined that the existence or nonexistence of 
either an implied or express warranty is a question of 
fact and if so found by the finder of fact will not be 
disturbed by the Supreme Court upon appeal. See 
Nielson v. Hermansen, 166 P.2d 536 and other cases 
cited therein. 
The criteria for what constitutes a warranty 
in connection with a sale are set forth so succinctly 
in the Nielson v. Hermansen case that it could well 
have been the prototype upon which our present Uniform 
Commercial Code definitions of warranty could have been 
based. 
The position taken by the appellant herein is 
that he acknowledged the responsibility to make one 
replacement of trees which breached the warranty but 
he sees no obligation to go beyond that point. The 
point of law at issue is covered well by a series of 
cases from California. See Ackerman v. Levy and 
Zentner, 45 P.2d 386 (1935); Southern California 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter, 178 P.2d 785 (1947); and 
Aced v, Hobbs, 360 P.2d 897. 
The Ackerman case states that warranties as 
to nursery stock and planting seed are "prospective" 
--relating to the happening of a future event--and 
are not broken until the happening of such event. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 8 
The Southern California Enterprises case 
involved a cause of action based upon a breach of 
warranty with respect to an expensive carpet and was 
held to state a cause of action on a warranty of a 
future happening and that the Statute of Limitations 
did not begin to run until the future event failed to 
materialize. The Court further held that the Statute 
of Limitations was tolled as long as the manufacturer 
attempted to repair the imperfections in the carpet by 
the doing of remedial work by the seller. See l Willis· 
ton on Sales 2d, Ed. §212A page 411. 
The final case cited, Aced v. Hobbs, was one 
involving a copper tube heating system that was installe; 
in a home. The tubing was bedded in cement. The warran: 
was implied to continue past the time when a Statute of 
Limitations would normally have barred an action for 
unmerchantability. The Statute was held to commence 
at the time the latent defect was discovered. As point· 
ed out in 67 Am. Jur.2d Sales §474 at pages 646 and 
64 7, an implied warranty against a latent defect is 
imposed against either the manufacturer (or grower) or 
a nonmanufacturing seller. The real test is whether the 
latent defect made the product unmerchantable and not 
fit for the particular purpose for which it was sold. 
As to the scope of the warranties, see 67 Alli. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 9 
Jur,2d Sales §506 at pages 684 and 685 where the term 
"condition" (the same term used in the contract between 
the parties to this suit) as used in a warranty that 
fruit trees are in a good condition is synonymous with 
the term "quality" and refers to the living state and 
capacity to grow, and to living trees and is broken by 
furnishing trees without sufficient vitality to take 
root and grow. Quoting Wellington v. Frazier, 19 Ont. 
L.88. 
Interpreting the contract in the manner 
suggested by appellant removed the risk of loss from 
the subcontractor and unfairly places it upon the 
purchaser of the trees and ignores the fact that the 
thing contracted for by the City was not just so many 
trees stuck in the ground but in fact was for the 
specified number of growing and viable trees which are 
able to sustain themselves through a full growing season. 
PO Ii'JT II 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT IS THE 
COST TO THE OTHER PARTY 
TO REMEDY THE BREACH. 
The subject of damages with respect to a breach 
of warranty for fitness varies with the nature of the 
article being warranted. 
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For instance, in the Southern California 
Enterprises case, which dealt with carpet which was 
unfit for use 1 the Court held that an allegation as to 
the purchase price when coupled with the fact that 
the article sold was unfit for use was sufficient to 
state a cause of action and the damages could amount 
to the cost actually paid by the buyer to the seller. 
Since the original contract price between the 
City and the appellants herein provided for payment of 
$550.00 per tree, it was not unreasonable for the Court 
to assess the lower figure of $330.00 that it did based 
upon the evidence received. The discussion of damages 
in 168 A.L.R. page 591 quotes cases in which seed is 
involved. They hold that the measure of damages is the 
difference between the value of the seed sold and the 
value of the product that would have resulted had the 
seed corresponded to the warranty; or that the damages 
were those special damages resulting from the breach of 
a warranty, which damages naturally resulted from the 
breach. There was no liability for remote or conjectural 
consequences but that the recovery should be the natural 
or proximate result of the defendant's alleged wrong· 
doing 
It appears, however, that the best rule is 
. h e of Lavar that stated by our Supreme Court in t e cas :------
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Park v. Moorman Manufacturin~, 121 Utah 2d 339, 241 
P.2d 914, which held that the fundamental principle of 
damages is to restore the injured party to the position 
he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of 
the other party. Based upon that rule, it would appear 
that the logical assessment of damages would be the cost 
to the City of redoing the work that the subcontractor 
had refused to do after due notice, The fact that he 
possibly could have done it at less expense to himself 
is waived when he refuses to perform and puts that duty 
upon the City which has an interest in seeing that the 
trees are planted uniformly and that their growth is 
uniform in appearance which would not be the case had 
the trees been deferred in their planting until after 
all litigation was completed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, as finder of fact, found 
sufficient evidence that there had occurred a breach of 
contract and that the express and implied warranties of 
fitness went beyond the contract period of one year 
from substantial completion, and in fact would continue 
on until the trees were shown to be viable for one year 
after planting. 
The trial court likewise correctly assessed 
damages at actual cost of remedying the breach and not 
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upon some lesser figure for which appellant could have 
provided the trees had he elected to do so. 
Respecttully submitted this /0 day of 
March, 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF n~ILING 
Ten copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief were mailed to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, in care of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, a~ 
two copies of the same were mailed to Gordon J. Low, 
attorney for defendants and appellants, 175 East 1st 
North Street, Logan, Utah 84321; and two copies were 
mailed to Gerald L. Turner, attorney for defendants and 
appellants, 343 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this /2- day of March, 1979, first class 
postage prepaid. 
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